Claude access¶
Most of the code and configuration in this project is written by Claude (Anthropic's LLM), run via Claude Code inside a dedicated devcontainer. This page describes what that access actually is: scoped and revocable, not blanket admin.
Environment¶
Claude runs Claude Code inside a devcontainer defined in thomelab-infra/docker/devcontainer/
and deployed via thomelab-infra/kubernetes/applications/devcontainer/. It is a separate
instance from Thomas's own devcontainer (devcontainer-claude vs. devcontainer-user), each
reachable at its own subdomain (claude-dev.thomelab.net / thomas-dev.thomelab.net), each
gated by Keycloak SSO restricted to a devcontainer-users group.
Kubernetes¶
Each cluster runs a dedicated claude ServiceAccount in a claude-access namespace, deployed
via ArgoCD like everything else. It is read-only, and scoped by an explicit allowlist:
- Cluster-wide, read-only: namespaces, nodes, PersistentVolumes, StorageClasses, VolumeSnapshots, Velero backup/schedule/restore status, node and pod metrics.
- Namespace-scoped, read-only, only in explicitly listed namespaces: pods and logs, deployments, statefulsets, daemonsets, replicasets, jobs, cronjobs, services, endpoints, configmaps, events, PVCs, ingresses, network policies, Traefik IngressRoutes/middlewares/TCP-UDP routes, ArgoCD Applications, CNPG clusters, ExternalSecret status, Longhorn volumes and backups.
- Secrets are excluded entirely — not read, not listed.
Which namespaces are visible is a per-cluster, explicit list (RoleBinding resources in
thomelab-infra/kubernetes/cluster-tools/claude-access/overlays/<cluster>/), not a default-allow
policy. Adding access to a new namespace is itself a change to thomelab-infra, going through
the same issue/branch/merge-request flow as everything else.
The kubeconfig is rendered by chezmoi from OpenBao, using this ServiceAccount's token. There is no
admin kubeconfig in the devcontainer. The default *-tailscale contexts go through a Tailscale
sidecar to Tailscale's Kubernetes-operator API-server proxy, where Claude's tailnet identity is
mapped to the same read-only permissions. The plain public / thomelab contexts connect
directly; for public, whose host firewall permits only port 443 by default, that path is
normally closed. The devcontainer's Tailscale identity has its own auth key and state, separate
from Thomas's devcontainer. Writes to the cluster (syncs, restarts, patches) are handed to Thomas
as commands, or go through ArgoCD.
Git and CI¶
Access to each GitLab repository is a separate project access token, one per repo, with the
Developer role, rather than one token with access to everything. A token scoped to
thomelab-site cannot touch thomelab-infra. The tokens are created by OpenTofu, stored in
OpenBao and rendered into the devcontainer by chezmoi; git remotes carry no token. Developer can
push branches and open merge requests, but main is protected and only Maintainers can merge.
On GitHub, Claude uses a GitHub App installed on a hand-picked list of repositories. The devcontainer mints a one-hour installation token from the App's key when it needs one. Each of those repositories has a ruleset on its default branch: pull request with one approval, no force-push. So the App can open pull requests but can't merge its own.
Every repository's stated convention is the same: no direct commits to main (enforced by branch protection on main). Every change is a
GitLab issue, a branch named after the issue, and a merge request. In practice, this means Claude
opens the issue, does the work on a branch, opens the merge request, and assigns it — merging is
a separate, human action.
Merge requests are assigned to Thomas, with a review request, and start with what he needs to do
(merge order, an apply to run first, what to check afterwards).
Harbor (the container registry) works the same way by omission: Claude has no credentials for
harbor.thomelab.net/thomelab-private, the auth-required project.
Encrypted content¶
ansible-vault and sops+age are real boundaries here, not just documented ones:
~/.vaultpass and the age private keys (Thomas's personal one, and the dedicated one seeded for
chezmoi) are provisioned only into Thomas's own devcontainer, never Claude's. So Claude can't
decrypt sops files or run an OpenTofu plan that needs them; it writes the change and Thomas runs
plan/apply.
OpenBao is scoped the same way. Claude's devcontainer authenticates with its own Kubernetes-auth
role, which can read a short list of exact paths (its kubeconfig, its GitLab tokens, its GitHub
App key, its Nextcloud app password). The only thing it can write is the login token for its own
browser terminal. New secrets are handed to Thomas as
bao kv put commands.
Other services¶
Claude has a local Nextcloud account, claude-bot: not an SSO account, not an admin, with a
small quota. It only sees what Thomas shares with it: the homelab backlog (a Deck board), the
homelab notebook (a Collective) and the calendars he chooses.
Destructive operations¶
Force-pushes, git reset --hard, --no-verify, and similar are not run without asking first.
On a branch, this is a session-level operating instruction rather than a platform-enforced
control — unlike the Kubernetes RBAC and per-repo token scoping above, nothing currently prevents
it there at the infrastructure level. main is the exception: branch protection (see above)
blocks a force-push regardless of what Claude does.